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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
years that some jurisdictions have abandoned the whole immu-
nity doctrine.18
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
TORTS - PRENATAL INJURIES - CHARACTERIZATION OF UNBORN
CHILD AS A "PERSON" IMMATERIAL TO RECOVERY
Action was brought by an infant plaintiff for injuries sus-
tained while in the womb of his mother, resulting from an auto-
mobile collision due to defendants' negligence. Plaintiff was
born seventy-five days after the accident with deformities of
his legs and feet. The trial court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss on the ground that New Jersey recognized no cause
of action for prenatal injuries. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, held, reversed and remanded for trial. An infant
has a legally protected interest in beginning life with a healthy
body. If another's wrongful conduct causes him to be born de-
formed, the infant may recover damages. Though not at issue,
the court indicated that the infant need not have been viable at
the moment of injury in order to state a cause of action. Smith
v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
For fifty years after the first unsuccessful attempt to recover
for prenatal injuries,1 most such actions were dismissed on the
ground that the common law did not recognize the unborn child
as an entity capable of being wronged by another's tortious
conduct.2  Recently however, judicial thinking on this subject
18. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957),
noted in 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 756 (1958), 71 HARv. L. REV. 744 (1958) ;
Ragans v. Jacksonville, 106 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958) ; Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), noted in 19 LoUisi-
ANA LAW REVIEW 910 (1959), 59 COLUM. L. REV. 487 (1959) ; 72 HARv. L. REV.
1386 (1959); 33 TuL. L. REV. 723 (1959).
Louisiana might possibly abandon or modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in the near future. The cases of Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114
So.2d 594 (1959), and Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La.
388, 115 So.2d 793 (1959), decided within a few months of the instant case (No-
vember 30, 1959), have created quite a furor. See McMahon & Miller, The Crain
Myth -A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
449 (1960), which treats these cases as a temporary set-back in the increasing
decay of governmental tort immunity and suggests enactment of laws to overrule
the Duree and Stephens cases and to modify the sovereign immunity doctrine in
Louisiana.
1. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
2. See ibid.; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). A com-
mon law view of the unborn child is found in 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
129-30. Perhaps this position was fortified in the minds of some judges by grave
doubts that dependable proof of causal connection could be produced. For ex-
ample, "What field would be opened to extravagance of testimony already great
enough-if Science could carry her lamp, not over certain in its light where
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has changed markedly 3 and only one court remains committed
to the earlier view.4  In order to give the unborn child legal
status, most of the recent decisions allowing a cause of action
have employed a fiction- that the fetus is a "person" at the
moment of injury.5 Recovery has been limited, at least nominal-
ly, to those situations where the fetus has been viable at the
moment of injury, i.e., so far advanced in gestation as to be
capable of living independently outside the womb.6 It is signifi-
cant, however, that no court has yet invoked the viability limita-
tion in order to deny a cause of action.7
In Cooper v. Blanck,8 Louisiana's only reported case dealing
directly with prenatal injuries, the court of appeal relied on
Article 29 of the Civil Code 9 to give the unborn child legal status
as a constructive "person" and thus found him entitled to re-
people have their eyes, into the unseen laboratory of nature -could profess to
reveal the causes and things hidden there - could trace a harelip to nervous
shock, or a bunch of grapes on the face to the fright." Walker v. Great Northern
Ry., [Q.B. 1891] 28 L.R. Ir. 69, 81. However, for a survey of modern medical
knowledge of prenatal injuries, see Note, 1 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS,
No. 6, p. 23 (1954).
3. The current trend is said to have commenced with Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.
Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See PROSSER, TORTS 175 (2d ed. (1955). See also
White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
383 (1952) ; Comment, 26 TENN. L. REV. 494 (1959) ; Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256(1951). In 19 of the 22 reported prenatal injury actions since Bonbrest v. Kotz
a cause of action has been granted.
4. In Massachusetts, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14
(1884) is still followed. However, in Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 463, 95
N.E.2d 206, 207 (1950), the court stated: "We do not intimate what our decision
would be if the question [of prenatal injuries] were presented for the first time."
5. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ; Kelly v.
Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949). Perhaps the courts have
thought it necessary to provide an immediate object of tortious conduct.
6. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 370, 374, 56 N.E. 638, 641,
642: This theory was first expounded in dissent: "A foetus in the womb of the
mother may well be regarded as but a part of the bowels of the mother during
a portion of the period of gestation; but . . . it seems to me . . . that whenever
a child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as that, should parturition by
natural or artifical means occur at such age, such child could and would live
separable from the mother and grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is
afterwards born and becomes a living human being, such child has a right of
action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person
at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother."
7. When faced wih a pre-viable injury, one court merely abolished the viability
limitation to which it had been theretofore committed. Taking note of the scientific
truism that a fetus is a separate biological entity from the moment of conception,
the court said: "We ought to be safe . . . in saying that legal separability should
begin where there is biological separability," implying that it would recognize a
cause of action for any injury sustained at any period of gestation. Kelly v.
Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 543, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953). See also Bennett
v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
8. 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923, unreported until 1949).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 29 (1870) : "Children in the mother's womb are con-
sidered, in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were already born. .. ."
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cover for personal injuries under Article 2315.10 The court also
adopted the viability limitation.
In the instant case, the New Jersey Supreme Court has in-
troduced a novel theory of recovery." Instead of treating the
fetus as a fictive "person," the court simply acknowledged an
infant's right to begin life with sound mind and body, holding
that one who abridges that right by causing the child to be born
defective is liable in damages. Though the issue of viability was
not raised in the pleadings, the court indicated that it would not
limit recovery to injuries suffered during the period of via-
bility.'2
Where it is shown that the unborn child was damaged in
utero and subsequently born alive, it appears immaterial to the
outcome of a suit for damages whether a court treats the fetus
as a "person" or merely acknowledges his ultimate right to begin
life in good health. But given different facts, the courts may
hesitate to apply either approach without qualification. For
instance, if the unborn child dies in the womb because of an-
other's negligence, one might argue that if the fetus were a
person before its destruction, the parent should be entitled to
bring an action for its wrongful death.'3 Though tenuous, this
proposition has formed the basis of recovery in several cases.14
Apparently the only legitimate objective of such an action would
be to compensate for mental suffering due to loss of prospective
parenthood, an element of damages which few courts have yet
10. The same approach was taken under a similar provision of the California
Civil Code in Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
11. The court's last pronouncement on prenatal injuries followed RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 869 (1934), which recognized no duty towards the unborn child.
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
12. The court objected to the viability limitation because, in many instances,
viability cannot be reliably established unless the child is actually born. It is
submitted, however, that the court overlooked the most compelling argument
against the viability limitation, i.e., that some of the most serious prenatal injuries
are incurred in early gestation, e.g., X-ray injuries. Accord, 1 CURRENT MEDICINE
FOR ATTORNEYS No. 6, p. 23 (1954).
13. Lord Campbell's Act, which served as a model for most American death
statutes, provides: "that whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by
wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as
would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain
an Action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such Case,
the Person who would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to
an Action for Damages." (Emphasis added.) 9 & 10 VICT. ch. 93 (1846).
14. "It seems too plain for argument that . . . through a wrongful act a
cause of action arises under the [wrongful death] statutes." Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 370, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949). See also Rainey v. Horn, 221
Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) ; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d
249 (1957).
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acknowledged. 15 But even if such emotional loss were a proper
damage element, it is submitted that a direct award to the parent
is much more reasonable than the circuity of an action for
wrongful prenatal death. Assuming different facts, suppose an
infant is born with a serious blood condition directly attributable
to the administration of wrong-type blood to his mother prior
to conception.'6 In the sweeping language of the instant deci-
sion one finds nothing which would preclude recovery by the
infant from the party responsible for the transfusion. Though
the viability limitation may be too harsh in disallowing recovery
for injuries inflicted in early gestation;17 it is submitted that
extension of liability to infants conceived after the mother's
injury would be to impose a burden on the tortfeasor unwar-
ranted by his conduct.
Louisiana courts may wish to re-examine the approach taken
in Cooper v. Blanck in light of the instant decision. If it is
unnecessary to consider the fetus as a person at the moment of
injury, it appears equally unnecessary to employ Article 29 to
impute personality to him.' 8 It is submitted that by employing
the theory of the instant case, recovery for prenatal injury can
be predicated exclusively on Article 2315.19 Furthermore, since
there is evidence that Louisiana courts will compensate for
mental suffering due to lose of prospective parenthood, an action
for wrongful prenatal death would be unnecessary.20
15. "Any injured feelings following the miscarriage, not a part of the pain
naturally attending it, are too remote to be considered an element of damage.
If the plaintiff lamented the loss of her offspring, such grief involves too much
an element of sentiment to be left to the conjecture and caprice of a jury. If, like
Rachael, she wept for her children and would not be comforted, a question of
continuing damage is presented, too delicate to be weighed by any scales which
the law has yet invented." Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 183, 190 (1880). See gen-
erally, Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1104 (1943).
16. An action was brought alleging these facts but was dismissed on the ground
that the statute of limitations had run. Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp.
580 (D.C.N.J. 1956).
17. See note 12 supra.
18. Except for prenatal injury litigation, Article 29 has been applied exclu-
sively to the accrual of property by the unborn child. There is no evidence that
the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code intended it to apply to personal injury,
nor does Planiol admit of this possibility. I PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (A
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) §§ 366-370 (1959).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870) : "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it .. "
20. Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847, 849 (La. App.
1951): "[W]e think, that when parents are actually expecting the arrival of a
child, and they are deprived of the fruition of that great expectation by the
actionable negligence of someone else, they may recover from the tortfeasor as an
item of damage for that particular loss."
In the only attempt made in Louisiana to recover for wrongful prenatal
death, the court denied a cause of action on the basis of a code provision that
"children born dead are considered as though they had never been born or. con-
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From the standpoint of legal analysis, the theory of recovery
as presented in the instant decision is preferable since it avoids
the use of fiction. However, it is believed that the instant theory
should not be applied as broadly as stated- that a cause of
action for prenatal injuries should arise only in those instances
where the infant survives birth and the injurious condition
arises subsequent to conception. 21 It appears that the instant
theory thus modified is as applicable in Louisiana as in other
jurisdictions.
Gerald LeVan
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - ACCIDENTS ARISING OUT OF
AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Plaintiff, the widow of a former captain on the city police
force, brought suit against the City of Baton Rouge under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute for the death of
her husband. In a physical examination the captain had been
found to be physically unfit for all duty except desk work.
Within a few months, the Chief of Police forwarded to him a
letter which in effect demanded his retirement. The trial court
found from the undisputed testimony of the deceased's physician
that the resulting emotional upset was a cause in fact of the
ensuing heart attack,' and recovery was allowed. On appeal to
the Louisiana court of appeal, held, reversed. Death caused from
agitation over retirement and occurring while on vacation
neither arises out of nor occurs in the course of the employer's
trade, business, or occupation. Seals v. Baton Rouge, 94 So.2d
478 (La. App. 1957).
Section 1031 of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act
provides that "if an employee . . . receives personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his
ceived." LA. CIVIM CODE art. 28 (1870). Youman v. McConnell, 7 La. App. 317
(1927).
21. It is felt that should the infant survive birth and afterwards die from
prenatal injuries an action for wrongful death would be appropriate. See Heins
v. Guzman, Orleans No. 9484 (La. App. 1924) (unreported) ; Janinsky v. Potts,
153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
1. The trial court noted that the cause in fact could have been of extreme sig-
nificance. In heart attack cases, the crucial issue is often cause in fact, even
where the accident is of a physical nature. In this particular case, however, this
issue was not contested by the defendant. In this connection, see Neldare v.
Schuylkill Products Co., 107 So.2d 487 (La. App. 1958), noted in 19 LOUISIANA
LAW REviEw 916 (1959) ; Kraemer v. Jahncke Services, 83 So.2d 916 (La. App.
1955).
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